

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY RABAT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 605

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR UNGA MO SP SS

SUBJ: 29TH UNGA: KOREA AND KHMER ISSUES

REF: A. STATE 275669, B. USUN 6001

1. I CALLED URGENTLY ON FON MIN LARAKI EARLY DEC 17 TO CARRY OUT INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED REFTEL (A). LARAKI GAVE EVERY INDICATION OF BEING ASTONISHED TO LEARN OF MOROCCAN ABSTENTION ON CHALLENGE TO KHMER CREDENTIALS. HE CALLED IN BENKIRANE, MFA DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, WHO WAS ALSO AT A LOSS TO EXPLAIN MOROCCAN VOTE. LARAKI THEN SHOWED ME COPY OF TELEGRAPHIC INSTRUCTIONS TO UN DELEGATION, WHICH CATEGORICALLY TOLD DELEGATION TO SUPPORT SEATING OF KHMER DELEGATION "UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES" AND TO OPPOSE ANY CHALLENGE TO KHMER CREDENTIALS.

2. LARAKI ASKED WHETHER THERE WERE ANY SPECIAL WRINKLES INVOLVED IN SYRIAN AMENDMENT. DRAWING ON USUN 5996, I INDICATED THAT MY INFORMATION WAS ONLY THAT SYRIAN AMENDMENT TO CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE RESOLUTION ACCEPTING ALL CREDENTIALS CALLED FOR MAKING EXCEPTION OF KHMER CREDENTIALS. LARAKI WONDERED WHETHER THIS WAS WHOLE STORY, SUSPECTING THAT OTHER COMPLICATIONS MIGHT HAVE BEEN PRESENT. FOR EXAMPLE, HE CONJECTURED, PERHAPS PRESIDENT OF GA HAD BEEN INVITED TO RULE ON ACCEPTANCE OR NON-ACCEPTANCE. I INDICATED EMBASSY WAS UNAWARE OF ANY SUCH COMPLICATING FACTORS.

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3. LARAKI, WARMING TO SUBJECT, WENT ON TO DENY STRONGLY ANY NOTION THAT GOM HAD NOT FULFILLED ITS COMMITMENT ON KHMER ISSUE, INASMUCH AS MOROCCO HAD STOOD WITH US IN CRUCIAL EARLIER UNGA VOTE, FOR WHICH STAND GOM HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM EXTERNALLY AND INTERNALLY. IN KHMER CREDENTIALS VOTE, LARAKI ARGUED, MOROCCAN VOTE HAD NOT BEEN ESSENTIAL -- IN ANY CASE, LARAKI REITERATED, THERE MUST HAVE BEEN SOME FURTHER ELEMENT OF WHICH NEITHER OF US AWARE.

4. LARAKI ALSO TOOK EXCEPTION TO IDEA THAT US HAD GONE TO ANY EXCESSIVE LENGTHS ON SAHARA ISSUE. SAHARA SOLUTION HAD NOT

BEEN PREJUDICIAL, HE CONTENDED. HE HAD NOT WANTED TO BRING THIS UP, HE ADDED, BUT AMBASSADOR WHITE'S SPEECH EXPLAINING US VOTE ON SAHARA RESOLUTION HAD BEEN VERY NEGATIVE AND HAD UNDONE SOME OF THE GOOD FLOWING FROM THE FAVORABLE US VOTE. HE CHARACTERIZED AS "ABSURD" THE IDEA THAT HE WOULD HAVE AGREED IN ADVANCE OF VOTE ON SAHARA RESOLUTION THAT USG HAD FULFILLED PROMISE MADE TO GOM (USUN 5775). HE WONDERED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN SOME MISTAKE IN INTERPRETATION FOR FRENCH TO ENGLISH ON THAT OCCASION.

5. LARAKI CONCLUDED WITH VIEW IT WOULD BE BEST TO CONSIDER THIS AFFAIR CLOSED, STRESSING AT SAME TIME HE COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY IMPLICATION OF BAD FAITH. I AGREED THERE WAS NOTHING TO BE GAINED FROM RECRIMINATIONS, PARTICULARLY AS FULL STORY NOT CLEAR.

6. ON KOREA, LARAKI STATED MOROCCO COULD NOT OFFICIALLY ADMIT SORT OF LINKAGE BETWEEN KHMER AND KOREAN ISSUES. HE THEN STATED "PRIVATELY" THAT MOROCCO HAD BEST OF RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA. GOM HAD GIVEN A COMMITMENT OF SUPPORT TO KOREAN FON MIN, WITH WHICH MOROCCO WOULD STAND, BUT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE BETWEEN MOROCCO AND KOREA.

7. GOM INSTRUCTIONS TO ITS UN DELEGATION WHICH LARAKI SHOWED ME WERE IN COMPLETE HARMONY WITH LARAKI'S STATEMENT TO ME BEFORE VOTE (RABAT 6028). I REGRET THAT I WAS NOT INFORMED OF PROBLEM ARISING WITH RESPECT TO MOROCCAN ACTING PERM REP ZAIMI'S NARROW AND APPARENTLY FALLACIOUS INTERPRETATION OF INSTRUCTIONS (

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(REFTEL B). QUICK INTERVENTION BY EMBASSY MIGHT WELL HAVE RESULTED IN CORRECTIVE ACTION ON THIS END BY FON MINISTRY, UNLESS, OF COURSE, TIME FACTOR MADE THIS IMPOSSIBLE. MUCH AS I REGRET THIS UNEXPECTED LAST-MINUTE DEFECTION, WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT MOROCCANS INDEED STOOD WITH US ON THE CRUCIAL EARLIER KHMER VOTE AT CONSIDERABLE COST, ALTHOUGH ALSO AT CONSIDERABLE BENEFIT TO THEM. I INTEND DISCREETLY TO GET WORD TO KING OF OUR UNHAPPINESS OVER THIS LATEST DEVELOPMENT, BUT I SEE NOTHING

TO BE GAINED AT THIS STAGE BY PROLONGING DEBATE WITH OTHER
MOROCCAN OFFICIALS.
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